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Abstract
Background: In	2017,	the	World	Health	Organization	published	“Medication	Without	
Harm,	WHO	Global	Patient	Safety	Challenge,”	to	reduce	patient	harm	caused	by	un-
safe medication use practices. While the five objectives emphasise the need to cre-
ate	a	framework	for	action,	engaging	key	stakeholders	and	others,	most	published	
research has focused on the perspectives of health professionals. The aim was to ex-
plore	the	views	and	experiences	of	decision-makers	in	Qatar	on	organisational	safety	
culture,	medication	errors	and	error	reporting.
Method: Qualitative,	 semi-structured	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	 healthcare	
decision-makers	(policy-makers,	professional	leaders	and	managers,	 lead	educators	
and	trainers)	in	Qatar.	Participants	were	recruited	via	purposive	and	snowball	sam-
pling,	continued	to	the	point	of	data	saturation.	The	interview	schedule	focused	on:	
error causation and error prevention; engendering a safety culture; and initiatives to 
encourage	error	reporting.	Interviews	were	digitally	recorded,	transcribed	and	inde-
pendently	analysed	by	two	researchers	using	the	Framework	Approach.
Results: From	the	21	interviews	conducted,	key	themes	were	the	need	to:	promote	
trust within the organisation through articulating a fair blame culture; eliminate man-
agement,	professional	and	cultural	hierarchies;	focus	on	team	building,	open	commu-
nication	and	feedback;	promote	professional	development;	and	scale-up	successful	
initiatives. There was recognition that the current medication error reporting pro-
cesses	 and	 systems	were	 suboptimal,	with	 suggested	enhancements	 in	 themes	of	
promoting a fair blame culture and open communication.
Conclusion: These positive and negative aspects of organisational culture can inform 
the	development	of	theory-based	 interventions	to	promote	patient	safety.	Central	
to	these	will	be	the	further	development	and	sustainment	of	a	“fair”	blame	culture	in	
Qatar	and	beyond.
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Despite the attention given worldwide to the development of pa-
tient	safety	systems	and	processes,	medical	errors	remain	a	major	
contributor	to	patient	morbidity	and	mortality,	with	estimates	in	
high income countries of one in ten patients being harmed while 
receiving medical care.1	Medication	 errors,	most	 commonly	 de-
fined	as,	“any	preventable	event	that	may	cause	or	 lead	to	 inap-
propriate	medication	 use	 or	 patient	 harm,	while	 the	medication	
is	 in	the	control	of	 the	health	care	professional,	patient,	or	con-
sumer,”2 are highly prevalent. It is estimated that these errors 
cause at least one death every day and injure approximately 1.3 
million	 people	 annually	 in	 the	United	 States	 (US)	 alone.2 Global 
estimates of costs resulting from medication errors are around 
$42 billion annually.3 While errors can occur at any stage of the 
medication	 use	 process,	 most	 published	 literature	 focuses	 on	
prescribing,	dispensing	and	administration	stages.	Systematic	re-
views have concluded that the causes of medication errors are 
generally	complex	and	multifactorial,	resulting	from	systems	and/
or human factors.4-9
In	March	2017,	the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	published	
“Medication	Without	Harm,	WHO	Global	Patient	Safety	Challenge,”	
primarily intended to reduce patient harm caused by unsafe med-
ication use practices.3,10 The authors proposed a target reduction 
of	 50%	 by	 2022	 for	 severe,	 avoidable	 medication-related	 harm,	
through	 improving	medication	 prescribing,	 dispensing,	 administra-
tion,	monitoring	and	usage.	Countries	were	mandated	to	systemati-
cally	develop	and	prioritise	an	action	plan,	involving	safety	experts,	
health	 care	 professionals	 and	 leaders,	 other	 key	 stakeholders	 and	
patient representatives to achieve this target.3
Key	to	meeting	the	WHO	challenge	is	promoting	a	positive	pa-
tient safety culture within healthcare organisations. Organisational 
safety	culture	has	been	defined	as,	 “the	product	of	 individual	 and	
group	values,	attitudes,	perceptions,	competencies	and	patterns	of	
behaviour that determine the commitment to and the style and pro-
ficiency	 of,	 an	 organisation's	 health	 and	 safety	management”.11 In 
an	attempt	 to	provide	an	objective	measure	of	 safety	 culture,	 the	
Agency	 for	Healthcare	Research	and	Quality	 (AHRQ)	and	Medical	
Errors	 Workgroup	 of	 the	 Quality	 Interagency	 Coordination	 Task	
Force	(QuIC)	in	the	United	States	sponsored	the	development	of	the	
Hospital	Survey	on	Patient	Safety	Culture	(HSOPS).12 This provides 
a quantitative assessment across healthcare organisations and hos-
pital	units	of	key	areas	of	strength	and	weaknesses	in	organisational	
safety	 culture	 thus	 providing	 a	 framework	 for	 development	 and	
baseline data for measuring change.
It	is	well	recognised	that	a	blame	culture	is	more	likely	to	occur	
in	organisations	which	“rely	predominantly	on	hierarchical,	compli-
ance-based	 functional	management	 systems,”	while	a	 “fair”	blame	
culture	is	an	indication	of	organisational	safety	culture	which	“elic-
its	 greater	 employee	 involvement	 in	 decision-making.”13	 There	 is,	
however,	 an	 accumulation	 of	 published,	 peer-reviewed	 evidence	
that there is an element of fear among health professionals in 
reporting	 medication	 errors,	 resulting	 in	 marked	 under- 
reporting.14-25 Effective and efficient error reporting systems and 
processes	should	aim	to	stimulate	and	sustain,	review	and	analyse	
error reports leading to the development of recommendations to 
reduce	and	ultimately	prevent,	errors.2
A	systematic	review	of	18	quantitative	studies	of	patient	safety	
culture	 in	 Arab	 countries	 using	 the	 HSOPS	 tool	 identified	 issues	
around	the	lack	of	non-punitive	response	to	error,	low	staffing	levels	
and poor communication.26 More recently a sequential explanatory 
mixed-methods	study	of	organisational	safety	culture	in	Qatar	also	
identified that potential influences on these issues were the social/
professional	role	and	identity	(eg,	lack	of	recognition	of	the	profes-
sional	 roles	 of	 nurses),	 emotions	 (eg,	 stress,	 anxiety)	 and	 environ-
mental	context	and	resources	(eg,	workload	and	system	failure).27	A	
study	conducted	in	parallel	in	Qatar,	using	the	same	methodological	
approach,	 indicated	 health	 professionals’	 emotions	 as	 key	 to	 un-
der-reporting	of	medication	errors,	with	qualitative	findings	describ-
ing	these	in	terms	of	“fear”	and	“worry”	that	reporting	“could	lead	to	
punishment,”	“worsen	working	relationships”	and	that	performance	
appraisal	and	development	“could	be	negatively	impacted.”28
The	 five	 objectives	 of	 “Medication	Without	 Harm”	 emphasise	
the	need	to	create	a	framework	for	action,	engaging	key	stakehold-
ers and others.3	 To	 date,	 the	 research	 in	Qatar	 and	 other	Middle	
Eastern	countries	has	focused	on	the	perspectives	of	practitioners,	
primarily	doctors,	nurses	and	pharmacists.	The	aim	of	this	study	was	
to	explore	the	views	and	experiences	of	decision-makers	in	Qatar	on	
issues	around	organisational	 safety	 culture,	medication	errors	 and	
error reporting.
What’s known
•	 The	World	Health	Organization	publication,	“Medication	
Without	Harm”	emphasises	the	need	to	create	a	frame-
work	for	action,	engaging	key	stakeholders	and	others.
•	 To	 date,	 the	 research	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 perspec-
tives	 of	 practitioners,	 with	 no	 consideration	 of	 key	
decision-makers.
What’s new
•	 Decision-makers	 expressed	 the	need	 to	promote	 trust	
within the organisation through articulating a fair blame 
culture	 and	 eliminate	 management,	 professional	 and	
cultural hierarchies.
• The noted more emphasis was required on team build-
ing,	open	communication	and	feedback,	and	scaling-up	
successful initiatives.
• Medication error reporting processes and systems are 
suboptimal,	with	suggested	enhancements	in	themes	of	
promoting a fair blame culture and open communication.
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2  | METHODS
2.1 | Design
This	 was	 a	 qualitative	 study	 employing	 in-depth	 semi-structured	
interviews.
2.2 | Setting
The	 research	 was	 conducted	 within	 Hamad	 Medical	 Corporation	
(HMC,	 the	main	 provider	 of	 secondary	 and	 tertiary	 healthcare	 in	
Qatar),	the	Ministry	of	Public	Health	in	Qatar	and	Qatar	University	
(the	national	university).
2.3 | Interview schedule development
The interview schedule was developed based on the results of previ-
ously	conducted	survey	and	focus	group	research	in	Qatar,27,28 with 
emphasis on: issues and priorities around error causation and error 
prevention; engendering a safety culture; efficiency and effective-
ness of the medication reporting system; and initiatives to encour-
age the reporting of medication errors.
2.4 | Sampling
The	sampling	frame	included	policy	makers,	professional	leaders	and	
managers	and	lead	educators	and	trainers,	who	were	identified	as	key	
decision-makers	 in	 areas	 relating	 to	 patient	 and	 medication	 safety.	
These individuals held positions of national strategic importance to 
influence policy and/or practice change relating to medication safety. 
The	participants	were	 identified	through	existing	networks	 in	Qatar,	
with	two	approaches	to	sampling	employed:	purposive	sampling,	ac-
cording to criteria or strata of position and institution; and snowball or 
chain	sampling,	where	interviewees	were	asked	to	nominate	relevant	
others who could contribute to the research.29
2.5 | Recruitment
Potential participants were emailed an information sheet outlining 
the purpose of the study and the expected time commitment. Those 
interested	were	asked	to	email	the	research	team	to	arrange	a	suita-
ble	date,	time	and	location	for	interview.	An	outline	of	the	questions	
was emailed in advance to participants to allow for reflection prior 
to	the	interview	taking	place.	Sampling	and	recruitment	continued	to	
the point of data saturation when no new data or themes emerged. 
The	approach	of	Francis	et	al	to	data	saturation	was	employed,	with	
an initial sample sufficient to cover all strata and a stopping crite-
rion	 of	 three,	 that	 is,	 recruitment	 continued	 until	 no	 new	 themes	
emerged from three consecutive interviews.30
2.6 | Data generation
Face-to-face	 interviews	 of	 30-45	 minutes	 were	 conducted	 by	
trained,	experienced	qualitative	 interviewers.	The	 interviews	were	
digitally	 audio-recorded,	 transcribed	 verbatim	 and	 independently	
checked	 for	 transcribing	 accuracy	 prior	 to	 analysis.	 Participants	
were	offered	 the	opportunity	 to	 review	 their	 transcripts	 (member	
checking)	to	allow	review	and	editing.
2.7 | Data analysis
Interview transcripts were analysed thematically by two independent 
members	of	the	research	team	using	the	Framework	Approach	of:	fa-
miliarisation	with	 the	data,	 identifying	a	 thematic	 framework,	 index-
ing,	charting,	mapping	and	 interpreting.31 Given that the discussions 
focused largely on aspects of safety culture and error reporting within 
each	organisation,	the	initial	coding	framework	was	based	on	the	key	
themes	identified	in	the	two	recent	studies	in	Qatar.28,29
2.8 | Ethics
The	study	received	ethical	approval	from	Hamad	Medical	Corporation,	
Medical	 Research	 Center	 Qatar	 (Approval	 7-388-3-095),	 Qatar	
University	 Institutional	 Review	 Board	 (Approval	 QU-IRB	 350-E/14)	
and	 Robert	 Gordon	 University	 Research	 Ethics	 Sub-Committee	
(Approval	 13-147).	 Free	 and	 informed	 consent	 was	 obtained	 from	 
each	individual	and	all	data	were	anonymised	during	data	generation,	
analysis and reporting.
3  | RESULTS
Interviews	were	conducted	with	21	participants,	all	of	whom	held	
strategic	 positions	 within	 healthcare	 in	 Qatar:	 nursing	 directors/
assistant	 directors	 (n	 =	 5);	 pharmacy	 directors/assistant	 directors	
(n	=	4);	medical	directors	(n	=	3);	executives/deputy	executives	in	the	
Ministry	of	Public	Health	(n	=	3);	university	educators	(n	=	2);	quality	
improvement	and	risk	management	directors	(n	=	2);	medical	educa-
tion	director	(n	=	1);	and	research	director	(n	=	1).
All	interviewees	were	well	aware	of	the	need	to	promote	patient	
safety	and	that	errors	were	prevalent	in	all	healthcare	settings,
It [errors] can happen at all levels. It can happen in 
outpatient. It can happen in daycare. It can happen in 
urgent	care	that	leads	to	admission,	and	it	can	happen	
on the ward. 
(INT	7)
They	 were	 able	 to	 differentiate	 between	 process,	 system	 and	
human	errors	including	the	causes	and	shortcomings	known	to	impact	
efficiency	on	the	wards,
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Sometimes,	we	will	find	the	system	fails.	Sometimes,	
it’s	like	process	problem	and	there’s	sometimes	human	
error,	like	I	find	the	staff	have	too	much	stress	in	the	
work	and	too	much	workload,	I	will	not	consider	it	a	
human	error.	The	system	is	actually	failing	the	staff,	
not the patient. 
(INT	4)
There	was	also	recognition	of	 the	 likely	 impact	on	the	 individual	
committing	the	error	and	many	related	this	to	their	own	experiences,
But	you	will	never	get	that	completely	out	of	the	sys-
tem that someone feels guilty about something …I 
mean	I	know	in	my	career	that	there	are	things	where	
I	feel	guilty,	you	know,	that	I	think	about	a	state	or	day	
where	maybe	you	did	a	mistake.	
(INT	7)
While	potential	causes	of	errors	were	discussed,	many	interview-
ees reflected on the economic downturns and the impact on recruit-
ment	and	staffing,
It’s	key,	the	lack	of	resources.	Right	now,	we’re	going	
through	a	staffing	squeeze	where	recruitment	has	be-
come an issue and we are really in need of staff… This 
could be a cause for possible medication errors. 
(INT	6)
While there was less familiarity with the specific systems and 
processes	involved	in	error	reporting,	there	was	discussion	around	
the	issue	of	under-reporting	impacting	effectiveness	and	efficiency.	
One interviewee also noted that this was not a situation unique to 
Qatar,
There	is	significant	under	reporting	that’s	making	that	
process	 less	 efficient	 and	 this	 is	 an	 issue,	 unfortu-
nately	it’s	not	only	here	in	the	region,	it’s	on	a	global	
scale… 
(INT	16)
Several	key	themes	emerged	around	error	causation,	error	report-
ing	and	potential	solutions,	as	follows.
3.1 | Promoting trust within organisations through 
articulating a fair blame culture
Key	to	learning	from	errors	and	advancing	the	patient	safety	agenda	
was	adoption	of	a	non-punitive,	fair	blame	culture,
And	so	I	think	we	have	to	get	over	the	fear	of	[report-
ing]	…there’s	a	little	bit	of	a	hesitation	around	singling,	
you	know,	singling	people	out.	But	actually	if	it’s	done	
in a professional way and a learning way… 
(INT	18)
Hand-in-hand	with	the	fair	blame	culture	was	the	notion	of	contin-
uous	improvement	and	cycles	of	shared	experiential	learning,
So it’s not a blame culture. It’s ongoing improvement 
because this is a problem. I have to say that every-
one	would	feel	threatened	if	you	ask	them.	Everyone	
wants to be the perfect healthcare provider. 
(INT	1)
Core to advancing the patient safety agenda was the right organ-
isational	 environment,	 safety	 culture	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 a	 fair	
blame	culture,	all	of	which	could	encourage	error	reporting,
Because	 ultimately,	 healthcare	 professionals	 know	
that	patient	safety	is	the	number	one.	If	they	know	
that,	that	if	an	incident,	if	an	event	is	reported	anon-
ymously,	 and	 there’s	 no	 penalty	 involved	 with	 it,	
then	I	know	that	for	patient	safety	they	will	report	
it. 
(INT	12)
3.2 | Eliminating management, professional and 
citizenship hierarchies
Some interviewees explained that blame existed among a culture 
of	 inequality	of	 professional	 standing,	with	 evidence	of	 engrained	
scapegoating behaviours. It became apparent that within areas of 
healthcare,	the	blame	culture	prevailed	for	certain	professions,
They [doctors] will blame a nurse even though it could 
be the fault of somebody else and they are always 
looking	 at	who	 they	 can	 blame	 rather	 than	 doing	 a	
system review…It is completely a blame culture and 
it’s everybody admonishing responsibility and mind-
ing	their	own	back.	
(INT	11)
Given	the	evidence	thus	far	of	closed	communications,	lack	of	re-
porting,	scapegoating	of	nurses	for	example,	open	communication	was	
challenging	particularly	within	multi-disciplinary	teams.
The	minute	you	mix	doctors	and	nurses	or	whatever,	
the	group	that	isn’t	doctors	or	non-doctors,	they	clam	
up completely. They are not… they do not feel that 
they	have	the	right	to	speak	out	against	the	medical	
fraternity. 
(INT	5)
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There was further recognition that these issues were complicated 
by the cultural differences among staff with shared professional iden-
tities	from	multiple	countries,
…what one’s expectations are of a doctor in another 
country don’t necessarily transfer to here. 
(INT	1)
The challenge of open communication was made even more diffi-
cult	not	only	between	professions,	but	also	between	different	levels	of	
experience alongside mixed nationalities.
There’s	not	a	reporting	culture	here…You	know	frankly,	
if	they	are	a	Syrian	trainee	and	they	see	a	mistake	made	
by	a	Qatari	senior,	they	are	not	going	to	put	it	down.	
(INT	5)
3.3 | Focusing on team building, open 
communication and feedback
Many of the interviewees discussed at length the need for open 
communication surrounding errors and a transparent and fair sys-
tem which would be responsive to prevent similar errors occurring 
in	the	future,
There	 should	 be	 a	 very	 good	 system,	 it	 should	 be	
transparent,	 it	should	be	systematic,	so	when	some-
one	detects	an	error,	what	are	the	steps	that	should	
happen,	 and	 there	 should	 be	 a	 system	of	 like	 feed-
backs	so	the	person	who	made	the	error	as	well	as	the	
one who reported the error. 
(INT	6)
There were encouraging reports of progress in team building mov-
ing	in	the	right	direction	to	promote	multidisciplinary	patient	care,	not-
ing	that	improvements	in	safety	culture	and	working	practices	required	
long-term	effort	and	investment,
I	think	overall	the	happiness	in	the	team	and	the	un-
derstanding for the structure has come up and there 
are	some	cultural	barriers	for	some	to	take	that	on	but	
we	know	we	are	working	on	that	one	too.	 It’s	 just	a	
matter of time. 
(INT	7)
It	was,	however,	apparent	that	there	was	some	way	to	go.	One	of	
the	 interviewees	discussed	their	experiences	of	professionals	know-
ingly	taking	on	tasks	beyond	their	knowledge,	experience	and	compe-
tence	rather	than	making	this	clear	to	others,
You	 know	 people	 do	 not	 even	 have	 the	 courage	 to	
say	 they	 don’t	 know	 something.	 They	would	 rather	
plough on and do something or agree to do something 
and	not	do	it,	than	say	they	can’t	do	it	or	they	don’t	
understand. 
(INT	11)
3.4 | Promoting professional development through 
experience sharing
Linked	to	promoting	team	building	and	open	communication	was	the	
requirement for professional development. There was an expecta-
tion of providing opportunities for learning from shared multiprofes-
sional	experience	of	errors	 in	healthcare	delivery,	always	with	 the	
aim	of	improved	patient	safety,
Instead	of	blaming,	 let’s	 learn	and	improve,	and	pre-
vent	such	errors	in	the	future.	Like,	so	like,	when	an	
error	 is	 detected,	 like	 if	 I’m	 a	 head	 nurse	 or	 a	 head	
pharmacist,	I	would	have	my	employees	together	and	
we	discuss	it	openly,	and	how	we	can	prevent	it.	
(INT	6)
3.5 | Scaling successful initiatives
While initiatives could be successful in specific settings or clinical 
areas,	 there	was	acceptance	 that	 to	be	effective,	 these	needed	to	
be	scaled-up	and	sustained	across	organisations.	This	would	require	
support	and	investment	from	key	individuals	in	leadership	and	policy	
development,
Any	 project	 you	 want	 to	 roll	 out	 or	 anything	 that	
you want to do that is what’s best for patient care or 
what enhances patient care must gain the support of 
hospital	administration,	 I	mean	the	CEO	[chief	exec-
utive	officer],	the	Medical	Director	and	the	Heads	of	
Departments. 
(INT	16)
4  | DISCUSSION
4.1 | Key findings
Key	decision-makers	in	the	field	of	patient	safety	highlighted	issues	
to	be	 tackled	as	part	of	 their	 commitment	 to	 reducing	medication	
errors.	Key	themes	which	emerged	in	this	qualitative	study	were	the	
need to: promote trust within the organisation through articulating 
a	 fair	 blame	 culture;	 eliminate	management,	 professional	 and	 cul-
tural	hierarchies;	focus	on	team	building,	open	communication	and	
feedback;	promote	professional	development;	and	scale-up	success-
ful initiatives. There was also recognition that the current medica-
tion	error	 reporting	processes	and	systems	were	 suboptimal,	with	
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suggested enhancements in themes of promoting a fair blame cul-
ture and open communication.
4.2 | Strengths and weaknesses
To	our	knowledge,	this	is	the	first	study	conducted	within	the	Middle	
East	exploring	 the	perspectives	of	decision-makers	 in	positions	 to	
effect organisational change in policy and practice relating to medi-
cation	safety.	 Indeed,	 there	 is	a	paucity	of	any	published	 research	
focusing	on	decision-makers,	with	only	a	few	studies	reporting	the	
perspectives and actions of nursing leaders.32,33 Further strengths 
the	multiple	steps	taken	to	promote	research	trustworthiness.	Given	
that	 the	 research	was	conducted	 in	Qatar,	 the	qualitative	 findings	
may not be transferable to countries beyond the Middle East.
4.3 | Interpretation
This	study	of	decision-maker	perspectives	on	 issues	around	medi-
cation	 errors,	 organisational	 safety	 culture	 and	 error	 reporting	
complements	our	earlier	work	on	the	perspectives	of	health	profes-
sionals.27,28	 Indeed,	 there	 are	many	 areas	 of	 congruence	 between	
these	 in	 terms	 of	 non-punitive	 response	 to	 errors,	 feedback	 and	
communication,	openness	of	communication	and	continuous	organi-
sational	learning.	The	decision-makers	were	well	aware	of	the	need	
for action at all organisational levels to promote patient safety.
One	theme	that	emerged	was	that	of	“fair”	blame	culture,	which	
was viewed as a positive move in eliminating scapegoating behaviour 
around	inequalities	of	professional	standing.	A	“fair”	blame	culture	is	
more	likely	to	occur	in	organisations	with	open	communication	and	
employee	 involvement	 in	 decision-making.13 Effective leadership 
and human resource management capabilities are paramount when 
transitioning	from	a	blame	culture	to	a	more	“fair”	blame	culture.34 
Many other themes identified in our study in relation to promoting 
greater	patient	safety	also	concur	within	these	concepts,	 including	
the	need	for	open	communication,	gaining	and	maintaining	trust	at	
all	 levels	 and	 removal,	 or	 at	 least	 open	 recognition,	 of	 hierarchies	
in healthcare settings and management. There was also widespread 
recognition	 that	Qatar	 is	 a	 country	of	mixed	nationalities,	 cultural	
differences,	 behaviours,	 expectations	 and	 perceptions,	which	 also	
had to be handled carefully. These added complexities have also 
been noted by others reporting that professional cultures contrib-
ute	 to	 the	 challenges	 of	 effective	 interprofessional	 teamwork	 in	
healthcare.35
Encouragingly,	many	decision-makers	described	initiatives	which	
had been implemented to promote patient safety and while these 
were	generally	small-scale,	they	were	perceived	to	be	successful.	It	
is,	however,	widely	recognised	that	scaling-up	and	sustaining	small-
scale or pilot studies is challenging and requires commitment and 
investment at all levels.36	Applying	organisational	and	implementa-
tion	theories	to	all	stages	of	intervention	development,	testing	and	
scaling,	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	success.37
When	errors	 are	 committed	or	near	misses	 identified,	 it	 is	 im-
portant that these are reported and handled within an effective 
and	efficient	error	reporting	system	and	process.	Interestingly,	the	
decision-makers	 were	 very	 aware	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 under-reporting	 
in	 Qatar,28	 and	 globally,2,3,10 and that optimising the reporting 
system and process could positively impact patient safety. Many 
themes	that	emerged	bear	striking	resemblance	to	those	which	also	
emerged	from	the	health	professional	study	 in	Qatar.28 There was 
recognition of the emotional stress of submitting an error report and 
beliefs of consequences of the punitive action which could result. 
Engendering	a	“fair”	blame	culture	should	have	a	positive	impact	on	
the effectiveness and efficiency of the reporting system.
The	WHO	Challenge	articulates	the	necessity	to	develop	strat-
egies,	 guidelines,	 plans,	 processes	 and	 tools	 to	 ensure	 safety	 of	
medication practice and to strengthen the quality of reporting 
and monitoring data.3,10	While	the	perspectives	of	these	decision- 
makers	 is	 clearly	 highly	 valuable	 in	 driving	 and	 enabling	 change,	
there	 is	widespread	acknowledgement	that	achieving	change	at	all	
levels	is	likely	to	be	complex.37	The	body	of	research	in	Qatar	can	be	
incorporated	into	these	developments	to	target	the	key	issues	iden-
tified.	Embedding	intervention	development	within	a	framework	of	
behavioural,	 organisational	 and	management	 change	may	 increase	
the	likelihood	of	success.
4.4 | Conclusions
This	study	of	decision-maker	perspectives	on	issues	around	medica-
tion	errors,	organisational	safety	culture	and	error	reporting	in	Qatar	
has	 complemented	 recent	 research	 on	 healthcare	 professionals,	
highlighting positive and negative aspects of organisational culture 
which	can	inform	the	development	of	theory-based	interventions	to	
promote patient safety. Central to these will be the further develop-
ment	and	sustainment	of	a	“fair”	blame	culture	in	Qatar	and	beyond.
ACKNOWLEDG EMENTS
The	authors	wish	to	acknowledge	the	contributions	of	all	interview-
ees,	as	well	as	support	departments	at	Hamad	Medical	Corporation,	
Doha,	Qatar.	This	work	was	supported	by	NPRP	grant	NPRP	7-388-
3-095	 from	 Qatar	 National	 Research	 Fund	 (a	 member	 of	 Qatar	
Foundation). The statements made herein are solely the responsibil-
ity of the authors.
ORCID
Derek Stewart  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7360-8592 
Ahmed Awaisu  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9029-8925 
R E FE R E N C E S
	 1.	 Jha	AK,	Larizgoitia	I,	Audera-Lopez	C,	Prasopa-Plaizier	N,	Waters	
H,	 Bates	 DW.	 The	 global	 burden	 of	 unsafe	 medical	 care:	 ana-
lytic modelling of observational studies. BMJ Qual Saf. 2013;22: 
809-815.
	 2.	 National	 Coordinating	 Council	 for	Medication	 Error	 Reporting	 and	
Prevention.	http://www.nccme	rp.org	Accessed	December	01,	2019.
     |  7 of 7STEWART ET Al.
	 3.	 World	Health	Organization.	Medication without Harm, WHO Global 
Patient Safety Challenge.	 Geneva,	 Switzerland:	 World	 Health	
Organization;	2017.
	 4.	 Lewis	 PJ,	 Dornan	 T,	 Taylor	 D,	 Tully	 MP,	 Wass	 V,	 Ashcroft	 DM.	
Prevalence,	 incidence	and	nature	of	prescribing	errors	 in	hospital	
inpatients. Drug Saf.	2009;32:379-389.
	 5.	 Ross	 S,	 Bond	C,	 Rothnie	H,	 Thomas	 S,	Macleod	MJ.	What	 is	 the	
scale	of	prescribing	errors	committed	by	junior	doctors?	A	system-
atic review. Br J Clin Pharmacol.	2009;67:629-640.
	 6.	 James	KL,	Barlow	D,	McArtney	R,	Hiom	S,	Roberts	D,	Whittlesea	
C.	Incidence,	type	and	causes	of	dispensing	errors:	a	review	of	the	
literature. Int J Pharm Pract.	2009;17:9-30.
	 7.	 Franklin	BD,	Reynolds	M,	Shebl	NA,	Burnett	S,	Jacklin	A.	Prescribing	
errors	 in	 hospital	 inpatients:	 a	 three-centre	 study	of	 their	 preva-
lence,	types	and	causes.	Postgrad Med J.	2011;87:739-745.
	 8.	 Keers	 RN,	 Williams	 SD,	 Cooke	 J,	 Ashcroft	 DM.	 Prevalence	 and	
nature of medication administration errors in health care set-
tings: a systematic review of direct observational evidence. Ann 
Pharmacother.	2013;47:237-256.
	 9.	 Thomas	B,	Paudyal	V,	MacLure	K,	et	al.	Medication	errors	in	hospitals	
in	the	Middle	East:	a	systematic	review	of	prevalence,	nature,	severity	
and contributory factors. Eur J Clin Pharmacol.	2019;75:1269-1282.
	10.	 Donaldson	 LJ,	Kelley	 ET,	Dhingra-Kumar	N,	Kieny	MP,	 Sheikh	A.	
Medication	without	harm:	WHO’s	third	global	patient	safety	chal-
lenge. Lancet.	2017;389:1680-1681.
	11.	 Study	Group	on	Human	Factors.	Organising for Safety: Third Report of 
the ACSNI (Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations). 
England,	UK:	HSE	Books;	1993.
	12.	 Sorra	 J,	 Gray	 L,	 Streagle	 S,	 Famolaro	 T,	 Yount	N,	 Behm	 J.	AHRQ 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture: User’s Guide.	 (Prepared	
by	 Westat,	 under	 Contract	 No.	 HHSA290201300003C).	 AHRQ	
Publication	 No.	 15-0049-EF	 (Replaces	 04–0041).	 Rockville,	 MD:	
Agency	 for	 Healthcare	 Research	 and	 Quality.	 http://www.ahrq.
gov/profe	ssion	als/quali	ty-patie	nt-safet	y/patie	ntsaf	etycu	lture	/
hospi	tal/index.html.	Accessed	December	01,	2019.
	13.	 Khatri	N,	Brown	G,	Hicks	L.	From	a	blame	culture	to	a	just	culture	in	
health care. Health Care Manage R.	2009;34:312-322.
	14.	 Bahadori	M,	Ravangard	R,	Aghili	A,	Sadeghifar	J,	Gharsi	Manshadi	
M,	Smaeilnejad	J.	The	factors	affecting	the	refusal	of	reporting	on	
medication errors from the nurses’ viewpoints: a case study in a 
hospital in Iran. ISRN Nursing. 2013;876563.
	15.	 Wakefield	 DS,	Wakefield	 BJ,	 Uden-Holman	 T,	 Borders	 T,	 Blegen	
M,	Vaughn	T.	Understanding	why	medication	administration	errors	
may not be reported. AJMQ.	1999;14:81-88.
	16.	 Stratton	KM,	Nlegen	MA,	Peppper	G,	Vaughn	T.	Reporting	of	med-
ication errors by pediatric nurses. J Pediatr Nurs.	2004;19:385-392.
	17.	 Patrician	PA,	Brosch	LR.	Medication	error	reporting	and	the	work	
environment in a military setting. JNCQ.	2009;24:277-286.
	18.	 Chiang	H,	Lin	S,	Hsu	S,	Ma	S.	Factors	determining	hospital	nurses’	
failures in reporting medication errors in Taiwan. Nurs Outlook. 
2010;58:17-25.
	19.	 Evans	SM,	Berry	JG,	Smith	BJ,	et	al.	Attitudes	and	barriers	to	inci-
dent reporting: a collaborative hospital study. Qual Saf Health Care. 
2006;15:39-43.
	20.	 Sarvadikar	A,	Prescott	G,	Williams	D.	Attitudes	to	reporting	med-
ication error among differing healthcare professionals. Eur J Clin 
Pharmacol.	2010;66:843-853.
	21.	 Kingston	MJ,	 Evans	 SM,	 Smith	 BJ,	 Berry	 J.	 Attitudes	 of	 doctors	
and nurses towards incident reporting: a qualitative analysis. Med 
J Aust.	2004;181:36-39.
	22.	 Hartnell	N,	MacKinnon	N,	Sketeris	I,	Fleming	M.	Identifying,	un-
derstanding and overcoming barriers to medication error re-
porting in hospitals: a focus group study. BMJ Qual Saf. 2012;21: 
361-368.
	23.	 Williams	SD,	Phipps	DL,	Ashcroft	DM.	Understanding	the	attitudes	
of hospital pharmacists to reporting medication incidents: a quali-
tative study. Res Social Adm Pharm.	2013;9:80-89.
	24.	 Alqubaisi	M,	Tonna	A,	Strath	A,	Stewart	D.	Quantifying	behavioural	
determinants relating to health professional reporting of medica-
tionerrors:	a	cross-sectional	survey	using	the	Theoretical	Domains	
Framework.	Eur J Clin Pharmacol.	2016;72:1401-1411.
	25.	 Alqubaisi	M,	Tonna	AP,	Strath	A,	Stewart	D.	Exploring	behavioural	
determinants relating to health professional reporting of medi-
cation errors: a qualitative study using the Theoretical Domains 
Framework.	Eur J Clin Pharmacol.	2016;72:887-895.
	26.	 Elmontsri	M,	Almashrafi	A,	Banarsee	R,	Majeed	A.	Status	of	patient	
safety	 culture	 in	Arab	 countries:	 a	 systematic	 review.	BMJ Open. 
2017;7:e013487.
	27.	 Stewart	D,	Thomas	B,	MacLure	K,	et	al.	Perspectives	of	healthcare	
professionals	 in	 Qatar	 on	 causes	 of	 medication	 errors:	 a	 mixed	
methods study of safety culture. PLoS One. 2018;13:e0204801.
	28.	 Stewart	D,	 Thomas	B,	MacLure	K,	 et	 al.	 Exploring	 facilitators	 and	
barriers	 to	medication	error	 reporting	 in	Qatar	using	 the	 theoreti-
cal	domains	framework:	a	mixed	methods	study.	PLoS One. 2018;13: 
e0204987.
	29.	 Creswell	J,	Clark	V.	Choosing	a	mixed	method	design.	In:	Huberman	
M,	Miles	MB,	eds.	Designing and Conducting Mixed Method Research. 
Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	SAGE	Inc.;	2006.
	30.	 Francis	 JJ,	 Johnston	M,	Robertson	C,	 et	 al.	What	 is	 an	 adequate	
sample	size?	Operationalising	data	saturation	for	theory-based	in-
terview studies. Psychol Health.	2010;25:1229-1245.
	31.	 Ritchie	 J,	 Spencer	 L.	 Qualitative	 data	 analysis	 for	 applied	 policy	
research.	 In:	 Creswell	 JW,	 Plano	 Clark	 VL,	 eds.	 The Qualitative 
Researcher’s Companion.	Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	Sage	Publishing	Inc.;	
2002;305-329.
	32.	 Stewart	 L,	 Usher	 K.	 The	 impact	 of	 nursing	 leadership	 on	 
patient safety in a developing country. J Clin Nurs.	 2010;19: 
3152-3160.
	33.	 Kanerva	A,	Kivinen	T,	Lammintakanen	J.	Collaborating	with	nurse	
leaders to develop patient safety practices. Leadersh Health Serv. 
2017;30:249-262.
	34.	 Halligan	M,	 Zecevic	 A.	 Safety	 culture	 in	 healthcare:	 a	 review	 of	
concepts,	 dimensions,	 measures	 and	 progress.	 BMJ Qual Saf. 
2011;20:338-343.
	35.	 Hall	P.	 Interprofessional	 teamwork:	professional	cultures	as	barri-
ers. J Interprof Care.	2005;19:188-196.
	36.	 Simmons	 R,	 Fajans	 P,	 Ghiron	 L,	 eds.	 Scaling Up Health Service 
Delivery: From Pilot Innovations to Policies and Programmes. World 
Health	Organization;	2007.
	37.	 Craig	P,	Dieppe	P,	Macintyre	S,	Michie	S,	Nazareth	I,	Petticrew	M.	
Developing and evaluating complex interventions: the new Medical 
Research Council guidance. BMJ. 2008;337:a1655.
How to cite this article:	Stewart	D,	MacLure	K,	Pallivalapila	
A,	et	al.	Views	and	experiences	of	decision-makers	on	
organisational safety culture and medication errors. Int J Clin 
Pract. 2020;00:e13560. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcp.13560
